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IV. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Recommendation, and the accompanying Order filed January 31, 2012. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellant Rubio Izaguirre ("Claimant") brought his case against the Defendants, R&L 
Carriers Shared Services, LLC., and Zurich American Insurance Co., to determine whether the 
Industrial Commission ("Commission") has jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of the 
elements of the claim brought by Claimant and his wife against a third-party tortfeasor, and 
whether Defendants' subrogation rights under Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extended to all of 
Claimant's third-party tort settlement, including any monies which Claimant received for pain 
and suffering, and money which Claimant's wife received for a loss of consortium claim. The 
Industrial Commission found that it did have jurisdiction to evaluate the reasonable value of the 
elements of Claimant's third-party settlement pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-707 and heard expert 
testimony as to the reasonable value of the Claimant's wife's loss of consortium component of 
the third party settlement. The Industrial Commission did find that the loss of consortium claim 
of Claimant's wife was not subject to the Defendants' subrogation rights. The Industrial 
Commission, however, declined to make a finding as to how much of the Claimant's third-party 
settlement were general damages and found that pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3), the 
worker's compensation surety had subrogation rights against all other elements of the Claimant's 
third-party settlement including any monies Claimant received for pain and suffering or general 
damages. 
It is from this holding that the Claimant appeals. 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACT 
Claimant hereby adopts by reference the Industrial Commission's findings of fact 
contained in paragraphs 1 30 of the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions or Law, and 
Order. 
A. Additional Facts 
In addition, Claimant offered testimony at the hearing with regard to the medical 
expenses, loss of wages and other special damages incurred by the Claimant at the time of his 
third-party settlement as follows: 
1. Past Medical Expenses 
2. Past Indemnity Benefits 
$20,374.02 
$23,144.63. 
In addition, Claimant offered testimony and evidence at the hearing establishing that 
Claimant's future special damages would, in all probability, fall within certain ranges: 
3. Future Medical Expense 
4. Future Indemnity Benefits 
$27,500.00 (Averaged) 
$17,442.00 (Averaged) 
Claimant also offered evidence at hearing with regard to the loss of consortium claim as 
claimed by Claimant's wife as noted above and requested that the Industrial Commission make 
specific findings with regard to this proof and also with regard to the Claimant's general 
damages, both past and future, as a result of the accident at issue. Specifically, the Claimant 
requested that the Industrial Commission make a finding that Claimant's general damage, as a 
result of his knee injury and the past consequences thereof and the future consequences thereof 
would total at least $61,539.35. 
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Despite this request, the Industrial Commission made no specific findings with regard to 
the elements of Claimant's case and found that the Claimant's entire recovery was subject to the 
subrogation rights of the worker's compensation surety pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). 
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IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
( 1) Whether the Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that the 
Defendants' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extend to all of Claimant's 
third-party settlement, including any monies which Claimant received for pain and suffering and; 
(2) Whether the Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Claimant's 
settlement as pain and suffering. 
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the Supreme Court reviews the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by 
the Industrial Commission, the Court exercises free review of questions of law. Hughen v. 
Highland Estates, 137 Idaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). Statutory interpretation is a 
pure question of law. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201,203,46 P.3d 18,20 (2002). 
As a matter of policy, the Court "must liberally construe the provisions of the workers' 
compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane purpose for which the 
law was promulgated." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087 
(2005). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical construction. 
Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759, 760(1996). 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
(1) The Industrial Commission erred as a matter of law in deciding that the 
Defendants' subrogation rights pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223(3) extend to all of 
Claimant's third-party settlement, including any monies which Claimant received 
for pain and suffering. 
Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission herein erred in its interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 72-223(3). Based upon this error in interpretation, the Industrial Commission felt 
it unnecessary to address all of Claimant's arguments with regard to the proper apportionment of 
his third-party recovery. Claimant first contends that the Industrial Commission erred in its 
statutory construction of Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). This statute reads as follows: 
"If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer 
having paid such compensation or having become liable therefor, 
shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee, to recover 
against such third party to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability." 
Idaho Code§ 72-223 (Emphasis Added.) 
In denying to exercise its jurisdiction to evaluate and apportion the elements of the 
Claimant's third-party settlement with respect to Claimant's general damages, the Commission 
found that "a plain reading of the statute fails to reveal an intention on the part of the legislature 
to limit a surety's subrogated interest in a third party recovery to that portion of the third party 
recovery which corresponds to a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws of this 
state." (R p. 16, ~ 45). Claimant contends that the Commission's broad interpretation of the 
statute is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and renders the term "compensation 
liability" superfluous. 
Furthermore, statutory language in the Idaho Code related to the subrogation rights of 
other sureties, statutes that are preexisting the Worker's Compensation Act, show that the 
Legislature has allowed other sureties unlimited rights of subrogation in clear and concise 
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language. Presuming that the Legislature has knowledge of these unrestricted subrogation rights, 
it must be presumed that the Legislature placed limited language in Idaho Code § 72-223(3) on 
purpose. Claimant contends, therefore, that the Commission's interpretation ofldaho Code§ 72-
223(3) is erroneous. Claimant contends that the plain language of the statute limits a workers' 
compensation surety to exercising its right of subrogation to areas of damages for which it would 
be liable under Idaho Workers' Compensation law. 
A. The plain language of Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limits a surety's right of subrogation. 
As a pure question of law, the Supreme Court exercises free review of statutory 
interpretation. Aguilar v. Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642,650,262 P.3d 671,679 (2011). In doing so, 
a Court must look to the language used in the statute, giving the words used their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning, and interpret the statute as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827,25 P.3d 
850 (2001). Additionally, in ascertaining the meaning of the words used, the Court should avoid 
an interpretation that would render certain words void, superfluous, or redundant. State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
i) The Commission's broad interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-223(3) renders 
the term "compensation" superfluous. 
The dispute in this case centers on the final phrase m Idaho Code § 72-233(3). 
Specifically, the extent of a surety's right of subrogation appears to tum on the phrase, "to the 
extent of the employer's compensation liability." As a first step in analyzing this statutory 
language, it is helpful to explore the defined meaning of the term "compensation," which the 
legislature used to modify the word "liability." 
The Idaho Worker's Compensation law defines all of the benefits to which a Claimant 
may be entitled pursuant to that law in the definitions section of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1 02(7), these benefits collectively are defined as follows: 
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'"Compensation' used collectively means any or all of the income 
benefits and the medical and related benefits and medical 
services." 
Income benefits are further defined in Idaho Code § 72-1 02( 16) as follows: 
"(16) 'Income benefits' means payments provided for or made 
under the provisions of this law to the injured employee disabled 
by an injury or occupational disease, or his dependents in case of 
death, excluding medical and related benefits." 
Medical services and medical and related benefits are also defined in the Idaho Worker's 
Compensation Act as follows: 
"(20) 'Medical and related benefits' means payments provided for 
or made for medical, hospital, burial and other services as provided 
in this law other than income benefits. 
(21) 'Medical Services' means medical, surgical, dental or other 
attendance for treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicines, 
apparatus, appliances, prosthesis, and related services, facilities 
and supplies." 
In examining these provisions, it becomes clear that any benefit awarded to a Claimant in 
a worker's compensation case is defined and regulated by the Idaho Worker's Compensation 
Act. As noted by Idaho Code§ 72-201, the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act was enacted as a 
substitute for a Plaintiff or Claimant's common law rights. Injured workmen in the State of Idaho 
have given up their common law rights in place of the Worker's Compensation Act. 
72-201 Declaration of Police Power. - The common law system 
governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries 
received from and occupational diseases contracted in industrial 
and public work is inconsistent with modem industrial conditions. 
The welfare of the State depends upon its industries and even more 
upon the wealth of its wage workers. The State of Idaho, 
therefore, exercising herein is policed in sovereign power, declares 
that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private 
controversy, and insuring certain relief for injured worker's and 
their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of 
questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, 
proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in 
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this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action 
for personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the Court and the State 
over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this law 
provided. 
In examining the provisions that set the boundaries of an employer's "compensation" 
liability, it is important to note that none of these provisions provide for the payment of an 
injured employee's general damages. That is to say, unlike a Plaintiff in a personal injury action, 
a Claimant in a workers' compensation action is not permitted to recover for general damages 
against the employer. Indeed, as the term "compensation" makes evident, general damages 
would fall beyond the extent of an employer's compensation liability. 
Claimant contends that the legislature's use of the modifier, "compensation," when 
describing the extent of an employer's right of subrogation indicates the desire to limit the right 
of subrogation. To be sure, had the Legislature intended to give the surety an unlimited right of 
subrogation, the statute would have been drafted much differently and would have plainly and 
unequivocally bestowed such an unlimited right. However, the Legislature chose to include 
modifYing and limiting language in drafting Idaho Code § 72-223(3). This Court must presume 
that the Legislature intended to give these limiting and modifying words significance and effect. 
Under the foregoing analysis, the intended significance of the defined term 
"compensation" appears to act as a limitation on the surety's right of subrogation. It seems 
highly unlikely that the Legislature would intend for the workers' compensation surety to receive 
a windfall by recovering for damages for which it did not insure. Claimant contends that the 
Commission's interpretation, which would serve to allow a workers' compensation surety to 
satisfy its right of subrogation to categories of damages beyond its compensation liability, 
renders the term "compensation" superfluous and is therefore erroneous. Claimant's 
interpretation is further supported by another Idaho statute related to the subject of subrogation. 
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u. The Legislature's use of restrictive language in Idaho Code Sections 72-
223(3) indicates an intention to limit a workers' compensation surety's 
right of subrogation. 
In construing the language of a statute, Courts presume that the Legislature, upon 
enacting a statute, has knowledge of all other statutes in existence at the time of enactment. Twin 
Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 218,254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011). 
Idaho Code Sections 72-223, originally codified in 1971, and 12-616, last amended in 
1919, address the subject of a surety's right of subrogation to a Claimant's third party recovery 
as a matter of law. Section 12-616 addresses a surety's right of subrogation outside of a 
worker's compensation context. Important to note in the general subrogation provision of Title 
12 is the language used by the Legislature to explicitly characterize the extent of the surety's 
right of subrogation against a third party award. 
Idaho Code § 12-616 reads: 
"Whenever any surety on an undertaking on appeal, executed to 
stay proceedings upon a money judgment, pays the judgment, 
either with or without action, after its affirmation by the appellate 
court, he is substituted to the rights of the judgment creditor and is 
entitled to control, enforce and satisfy such judgments in all 
respects as if he had recovered the same." 
Idaho Code§ 12-616 (Emphasis Added). 
The language used in this statute leaves no uncertainty as to the surety's broad statutory 
right of subrogation. The surety's right of subrogation is essentially unlimited in that the surety 
is entitled to "satisfy such judgments in all respects." To be sure, this language gives a surety the 
absolute right to satisfy its interests in all aspects of any recovery. By contrast, within the Idaho 
Workers' Compensation Act, the legislature limited a surety's right of subrogation "to the extent 
ofthe employer's compensation liability." 
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The differing language in Idaho Code § 72-223, a statute enacted decades after the Title 
12 subrogation statute, strongly indicates the legislature's intent to treat the workers' 
compensation surety as a uniquely situated subrogee. Because an employer has limited 
compensation liability to a Claimant under the Workers' Compensation Act, it logically follows 
that these same employers would have limited rights with respect to subrogation. In addition to 
the inclusion of the modifier, "compensation," as discussed above, had the legislature intended 
Section 72-223(3) to give the workers' compensation surety absolute rights to all of a Claimant's 
third party recovery, the legislature could have mirrored the all-encompassing language found in 
Section 12-616. Instead of utilizing the broad phraseology conferring an absolute right of 
subrogation as it had in Idaho Code § 12-616, the legislature used language of limitation by 
drafting the workers' compensation statute to read, "[the employer] shall be subrogated to the 
rights of the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability" in Idaho Code§ 72-223(3). 
Claimant contends that for the reasons set forth above, the Commission's broad 
interpretation of a workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation is in conflict with the 
plain language of the statute. 
B. Claimant's interpretation of I. C. § 72-223(3) is supported by cases from other states 
with similar workers' compensation subrogation statutes. 
The state of Kentucky has a statute similar to Idaho Code § 72-223. The text of the 
Kentucky statute reads in pertinent part: 
"Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under this 
chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in some 
other person than the employer a legal liability to pay damages, the 
injured employee may either claim compensation or proceed at law 
by civil action against such other person to recover damages, or 
proceed both against the employer for compensation and such 
other person to recover damages, but he shall not collect from both 
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.... If compensation is awarded under this chapter, the employer, 
his insurance carrier, the special fund, and the uninsured 
employer's fund, or any of them, having paid the compensation or 
having become liable therefore, may recover in his or its own name 
or that of the injured employee from the other person in whom 
legal liability for damages exists, not to exceed the indemnity paid 
and payable to the injured employer, less the employee's legal fees 
and expense." 
Mastin v. Liberal Markets, 674 S.W.2d 7, 10-11 (Ky. 1984) (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.700) 
(Emphasis Added) 
When comparing the Idaho and Kentucky statutory schemes with respect to subrogation, 
the similarities are noteworthy. Most significant to the case at bar is the right of subrogation 
granted to a workers' compensation surety after the Claimant receives a settlement or award 
from a third party defendant. Under Kentucky law, the employer is entitled to recovery "not to 
exceed the indemnity paid and payable to the injured employer," less attorney's fees. This is 
similar to Idaho's provision that limits an employer's right of subrogation "to the extent of the 
employer's compensation liability." In a case raising the same issue of statutory interpretation 
now before this Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed its state's statutory language 
related to an employer's right of subrogation. 
In Mastin, supra, an injured worker brought a third-party case and made a settlement of 
that case after inhaling insecticides on the job. 674 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1984). In interpreting the 
Kentucky law quoted above, the court squarely addressed the issue of the subrogation of general 
damages now before this Court. !d. at 11-12. 
In its decision, the Kentucky court noted that the settlement made by the injured Claimant 
of $50,000.00 had been apportioned by the Claimant and the third-party only and therefore noted 
that the apportionment was not binding on the workers' compensation surety. !d. at 11. The 
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Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the worker's compensation surety was entitled to 
a full and fair and impartial decision as to the correct amount to be attributed to each element of 
damages for which the Claimant sought recovery. !d. at 13. 
In order to further guide the parties on remand, the Kentucky Court further noted that the 
workers' compensation right was limited to those elements of Claimant's recovery which were 
duplicated by the workers' compensation benefits paid and specifically found that if the third 
party settlement was found to include elements not included in the workers' compensation 
recover such as pain and suffering, the surety had no right to access those benefits. !d. at 12. 
In limiting the workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation against a third party 
tort settlement, the court in Mastin, cited and relied upon the case of Hillman v. American 
Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 631 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1982), the leading case in Kentucky 
on the issue of workers' compensation subrogation rights. In Hillman, an injured worker had 
brought a third-party case and had proceeded to trial before a judge to determine damages. !d. at 
848. The worker's compensation insurance company had intervened to assert its claim for 
subrogation and also presented evidence to the trial court. !d. After evidence demonstrating the 
medical expenses, weekly benefits and future benefits to be paid to the injured Claimant under 
the worker's compensation law and additional benefits demonstrating his tort damages, the trial 
court made specific findings as to each of the specified elements. !d. at 848-849. A dispute 
arose thereafter as to whether or not the worker's compensation insurance company could 
exercise its subrogated rights as against those elements of the damages not insured by workers' 
compensation, and the court determined that the statute limited subrogation to only damages 
covered by the worker's compensation laws. !d. at 849-850. 
Construing the Kentucky statute quoted above, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that 
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the workers' compensation surety was indeed subrogated to those items which were covered and 
which they would have to pay in the future. !d. However, the court found that other items, such 
as pain and suffering, were beyond the reach of the worker's compensation surety because the 
workers' compensation surety would not and had not paid those types of benefits to the injured 
Claimant. !d. 
In addition to Kentucky, the State of Washington has interpreted a limitation in its 
workers' compensation subrogation statute construing language similar to the language in the 
Idaho statute. In Washington, the workers' compensation surety, the Department of Labor and 
Industries, is permitted to subrogate against a third party recovery as set forth in RCW 
51.24.060(1): 
"The distribution formula requires payment in the following order: 
(a) attorney's fees and costs, (b) twenty-five percent to the injured 
worker free of any claim by the Department, (c) to the Department 
the balance of the recovery made, but only to the extent necessary 
to reimburse the Department for benefits paid, and (d) to the 
injured worker any remaining balance." 
Tobin v. Department of Labor & Industries, 169 Wn.2d 396, 239 P.3d 544 (2010) (quoting 
Wash. Rev. Code§ 51.24.060) (Emphasis Added). 
This Washington statute bears a significant similarity to the Idaho statute addressing the 
same subject. Although differing from Idaho in the initial apportionment of the third party 
recovery, the Washington statute nonetheless includes language describing the extent to which 
the workers' compensation surety can recover under its right of subrogation. Specifically, the 
Washington surety can recover "to the extent necessary to reimburse the Department for benefits 
paid," much like an Idaho surety can only recover "to the extent of the employer's compensation 
liability." 
In a recent Washington Supreme Court case rmsmg the same issue of statutory 
interpretation now before this Court, the Washington Supreme Court addressed its state's 
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statutory language related to a workers' compensation surety's right of subrogation. In Tobin, 
supra, an injured worker who had received workers' compensation benefits also brought a third-
party case after he was injured when a crane boom, operated by a third-party, swung 
unexpectedly and crushed him against a post. 169 Wn.2d at 398, 239 P.3d at 545. The 
Department of Labor & Industries found that the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled 
and ordered the commencement of lifetime benefits. !d. In the meantime, the injured Claimant 
brought a lawsuit against the negligent third-party and settled that case for a significant amount 
of money, a large portion of which was categorized as pain and suffering. Jd. After the 
Department of Labor & Industries indicated that it would exercise the Departments subrogated 
right as against the entire settlement, the injured Claimant appealed to the Superior Court, 
arguing that the Department was not entitled to subrogate its interest against benefits for which it 
would not be liable under the state workers' compensation law. Id. at 399, 545. 
The Superior Court, relying on the Washington case, Flanigan v. Department of Labor 
& Industries, 123 Wash.2d 418, 869 P.2d 14 (1994), held that Washington surety could only be 
reimbursed for benefits which it had paid and that because the Department would not be liable to 
compensate the injured claimant for pain and suffering, it could not therefore recover from the 
Claimant for those benefits. Tobin at 399, 545. 
After intermediate appeal, the Washington Supreme Court, after gomg through a 
comprehensive analysis, affirmed and found that the statutory right of subrogation possessed by 
the Department only allowed it to recover for damages which it had paid out. Jd. at 404, 548. 
In Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en bane has reached the same result as 
Washington and Kentucky Courts. In the case of Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority 
v. Jorgensen, 992 P.2d 1156 (2000), the Supreme Court addressed the appeal of a lower Court's 
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decision which held that the worker's compensation insurer was only subrogated to those claims 
which it had paid out and not to Claimant's entire personal injury award nor to his wife's loss of 
consortium award. 
In that case, it appeared that an injured worker and his wife brought a lawsuit against 
three separate defendants because of the injury which the Claimant suffered while on the job. 
Because the worker was receiving worker's compensation benefits, the Colorado Compensation 
Insurance Authority intervened in the litigation. After the worker's compensation Surety and the 
Claimant made a settlement with all of the third-parties, the Claimant asked the Court for an 
evidentiary hearing to apportion the settlement proceeds between economic, non-economic and 
loss of consortium amounts. The trial court denied the Claimant's request and found that the 
worker's compensation insurance company had subrogation rights against the entire recovery. 
The Court of Appeals in Colorado reversed holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to 
apportion the settlement proceeds and that the worker's compensation Surety's subrogation 
rights did not extend to the non-economic losses suffered by the Claimant nor did these rights 
extend to the claim of the Claimant's spouse for loss of consortium. 
After discussing the jurisdictional issue at some length, the Supreme Court turned to the 
extent of the worker's compensation insurance company's subrogation rights. Starting from the 
statutory framework, the Court noted that the ability of the worker's compensation insurance 
company to recover was limited by a statute reading as follows: 
The insurance carrier shall not be entitled to recover any sum in 
excess of the amount of compensation for which said carrier is 
liable under said articles to the injured employee but to that extent 
said carrier shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured 
employee against said third-party causing the injury. 
(See, Wests CRSA 8-41-203(1) (Emphasis Added). 
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After citing principles of statutory construction very similar to those here in Idaho, the 
Colorado Supreme Court noted that to allow the worker's compensation insurance company 
access to the Claimant's pain and suffering recovery and to a claim on the Claimant's wife's loss 
of consortium would be in violation of the plain terms of the statute and would allow the 
worker's compensation surety to recovery for benefits for which it had never paid in the first 
place. Citing Tate v. Industrial Claims Appeal Office, 815 P.2d 15, 16 (Colo. 1991), the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that the insurers subrogation rights are not absolute and do not 
extend to every right that the Claimant or her dependents have against a third-party tortfeasor. 
See also, Martinez v. St. Joseph Hospital and Nursing Home of Del Norte, Inc., 878 P.2d 13, 15 
(Colo.App. 1993). 
Addressing the ever present argument against allowing a Claimant's double recovery, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado noted as follows: 
"An important policy of a statute is to avoid double recoveries by 
Claimant. (Citations omitted). CCIA argues that Jorgensen would 
receive a double recovery which it could not exercise its 
subrogation rights against his entire net recovery. We find this 
argument unpersuasive. 
Under our interpretation of the section, the Claimant receives no 
double recovery. The double recovery occurs when the Claimant 
receives worker's compensation benefits, such as medical costs 
and lost wages, and recovers those same benefits from the 
tortfeasor without reimbursing the insurer. No double recovery 
occurs when the Claimant receives worker's compensation benefits 
from the insurer and non-economic benefits from the tortfeasor 
because the Claimant only receives the damages that he would be 
entitled to if he had only pursued his personal injury claims: non-
economic and economic damages." 
(See, 992 P.2d at 1165-1166). 
Claimant herein contends that the interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-223 which he 
advances in this case likewise does not provide for a double recovery. Allowing a Claimant to 
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retain the proceeds of his pain and suffering award in a third-party settlement does not mean that 
Claimant will have a double recovery. Claimant would still be obligated to return the worker's 
compensation insurance company the net proceeds of the medical benefits, lost wage and 
impairment monies which he had received pursuant to his worker's compensation case and 
would likewise be obligated to allow the worker's compensation surety a set off of future 
medical and wage loss benefits pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-223. Allowing a Claimant to retain 
his award for pain and suffering does not constitute a double recovery here nor did it in the State 
of Colorado. 
Based upon the foregoing authorities, Claimant contends that the weight of authority in 
this matter demonstrates that a workers' compensation surety should not have any access to that 
part of the settlement achieved by the Claimant which is attributable to his pain and suffering. 
Worker's compensation does not allow for a Claimant to obtain pain and suffering benefits and 
the worker's compensation Surety should therefore not be able to obtain those benefits from the 
Claimant. 
C. The Industrial Commission erred in its interpretation of the Court's holding in 
Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P.2d 164 (1999). 
In reaching the ultimate decision in this case, the Industrial Commission addressed this 
Court's previous decision in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., supra, at some length. In 
paragraphs 41 and 42 of the Industrial Commission's decision, see, R. pp. 14-15 ~~ 41-42, the 
Industrial Commission noted that the Struhs case was important to the decision herein but that 
the posture of the instant case was much different than the posture of the case in Struhs. 
Summarizing, in the Struhs case, a Claimant attorney had made a settlement with a 
negligent third-party and had attempted to characterize the nature and extent of that recovery in 
its agreement with the third-party, without any participation by the worker's compensation 
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surety. The Claimant in Struhs, thereafter attempted to deny any subrogation rights at all by 
claiming that the settlement did not include any of the monies which had been paid out by the 
workman's compensation surety. 
The Industrial Commission found that the Claimant and the third-party could not 
unilaterally characterize the settlement made so as to deny subrogation rights to the worker's 
compensation surety pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-223(3) and, on appeal, this Court affirmed. 
In the instant case, the Claimant and the Defendant agreed that the Claimant's previous 
attorney's attempt to characterize the nature and extent of the settlement was not binding and 
irrelevant to the proceedings. The Industrial Commission summarized the parties approach and 
the posture of the proceedings as follows: 
"Of course, this case is different from Struhs in that Claimant does 
not insist upon the application of the allocation of the proceeds of 
settlement which was attempted by Claimant's fonner counsel. 
Indeed, Claimant acknowledges that such a unilateral allocation is 
invalid under Struhs. Rather, what Claimant proposes is that the 
evidentiary hearing of July 26, 2011 provided the parties an 
opportunity to adduce evidence and make argument on how the 
proceeds of the settlement should be allocated, and in this way 
accomplish the allocation which was prohibited by claimant's 
unilateral attempt at the same in Struhs. In short, per Claimant, 
Struhs does not prohibit the protection of certain elements of a 
third party recovery from the subrogation claim of the surety. 
Struhs merely prohibits Claimant from undertaking this action 
unilaterally. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Idaho 
statutory scheme clearly anticipates that the right of subrogation 
attaches to the entirety of a third party recovery, less surety's 
responsibility for the payment of its proportionate share of costs 
and attorney fees. Defendants argue that Struhs is, at the very 
least, consistent with the proposition." 
(See, R p. 15 ~ 43.) 
The Industrial Commission then proceeded to find that the Struhs case concluded that the 
language of agreement must be ignored and the worker's compensation surety's right of 
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subrogation would need to extend to the entire third-party recovery. The Industrial Commission 
reasoned that if the Court had been of the view that Idaho Code § 72-223(3) limited the surety's 
right of subrogation, it would have found it necessary to remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission. Because the Court did not make such a remand, the Industrial Commission 
concluded that the Court found, in effect, that the entire settlement of the Claimant in Struhs was 
subject to the rights of the worker's compensation subrogated interest. The Commission's 
finding at paragraph 43 in this regard reads as follows: 
"In the context of the question of whether or not a portion of the 
proceeds of a third party settlement are not subject to the I. C. § 72-
223 right of subrogation, Struhs is just as important for what it 
does not say, as what it says. Having specifically found that the 
claimant in Struhs could not affect the surety's right of subrogation 
by incorporating certain language into the third party settlement to 
which surety was not a party, the Court concluded that the 
language of the agreement must be ignored, and that surety's right 
of subrogation was deemed to extend to the entire third party 
recovery. Had the Court been of the view that I.C. § 72-223 limited 
surety's right of subrogation to that portion of the proceeds of a 
third party recovery which corresponded to workers' compensation 
benefits paid, it would, presumably, have found it necessary to 
remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings 
along the lines of the inquiries which are before the Commission in 
the instant matter." 
(See, R p. 15 ~ 43). (Emphasis Added). 
Claimant contends that the Commission inferred too much from this Court's narrow 
holding in Struhs. 
Claimant agrees with the Commission's reading of Struhs insofar as Struhs stands for the 
proposition that a Claimant cannot unilaterally characterize his third party settlement in such a 
way as to affect the employer's statutory right of subrogation. However, Claimant contends that 
the Commission's reliance on a matter of procedure to interpret the resolution of an issue not 
before the Court is erroneous. 
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In Struhs, the Claimant, through his attorney, made a settlement with a third-party 
without consultation or agreement by the worker's compensation. !d. at 717, 166. The 
settlement agreement attempted to classify the Claimant's damages in a third party settlement as 
purely non-economic. !d. After the Industrial Commission made findings fully in favor of the 
workers' compensation surety ordering repayment, the Claimant filed an appeal. Id. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court found that the characterization of the settlement as between the Claimant and 
the third-party did not bind the workers' compensation insurance company because they were 
not a party to the agreement in the first place. I d. at 721, 170. 
In holding for the Employer/Surety, the Court was never presented with a fully developed 
record developed by all of the parties to the question as the Court has herein. In the Struhs case, 
the Court was simply concerned with a very narrow issue of whether or not a Claimant in a third-
party could unilaterally restrict the employer's subrogation rights without their participation. 
The Court found that a Claimant and third-party could not do so in accord with many decisions 
from across the county. 
The instant case, however, is presented to the Court on a very different posture. In this 
case, as noted by the Industrial Commission, the worker's compensation Surety and the Claimant 
participated in a hearing in which both parties were accorded the right to offer evidence and 
argument with regard to the proper allocation of the third-party settlement and the legal effect of 
that allocation. The posture of this case is much different than the posture of the Struhs case, and 
·~ I ' 0 Claimant contends that the precise question presented herein has never before been addressed to 
the Industrial Commission or to the Supreme Court based upon a proper evidentiary and 
procedural record. 
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Claimant contends that the Industrial Commission's reliance upon the Struhs decision is 
misplaced and that the Struhs Court never reached the issue presented herein either expressly or 
impliedly. 
(2) The Industrial Commission erred in failing to designate part of Claimant's 
settlement as pain and suffering. 
Because the Industrial Commission made a decision of law that the Defendants herein are 
entitled to Claimant's entire settlement, they did not reach the issue of the proper allocation of 
Claimant's settlement and decide how much of Claimant's settlement was properly pain and 
suffering. Claimant contends that if this Court finds that the Industrial Commission erred in this 
legal decision, it will be necessary to remand this case to the Industrial Commission so that 
additional factual findings can be made. Claimant therefore requests that this Court remand this 
case back to the Industrial Commission for proper factual findings should this Court agree with 
the legal argument made above. 
VII. SUMMARY 
In summary, it appears that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to evaluate the 
reasonable value of the elements of Claimant's third-party settlement. Indeed, the Commission 
has already done so with respect to the loss of consortium component of the third party 
settlement in this case. Unfortunately, the Industrial Commission refused to allow Claimant to 
keep any part of his general damages or pain and suffering recovery and refused to apportion the 
settlement to demonstrate which part of the settlement constituted this classification of damages. 
Claimant contends that the plain language ofldaho Code § 72-223(3) limits a surety from 
recovering against damages for which it did not insure. That is to say, the statute would operate 
to prohibit the Defendants herein from accessing any part of a settlement designated by the 
Industrial Commission as pain and suffering. This view of the statutory language is in accord 
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with the Idaho policy that the workers' compensation statutes should be construed broadly in 
order to provide a Claimant a fair and equitable recovery. Additionally, Claimant's view of the 
limited right of subrogation is supported by out-of-state cases interpreting similar statutory 
language. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the limitation on a surety's right of subrogation 
would not grant the Claimant a double recovery in this case. Rather, the limitation would allow 
the Claimant the opportunity to retain some portion of the third party settlement which he has 
realized solely by virtue of his pain and suffering an area of coverage which the workers' 
compensation insurance would never be liable for in the first place. Claimant contends that 
allowing the surety to access damages which the Industrial Commission finds to be attributable 
to pain and suffering essentially enlarges the rights of the surety to recover against that which it 
does not insure; all at the expense of the Claimant's just recovery. 
For the forgoing reasons, Claimant respectfully requests this Court find that Idaho Code§ 
72-223(3) limits a surety's subrogated interest in a third party recovery to that portion of the third 
party recovery which corresponds to a benefit payable under the workers' compensation laws of 
this state, and to remand this matter to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings 
consistent with this finding. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED This l \ day of June, 2012. 
RichardS. Owen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this l\ day of June, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was mailed, U. S. Postage prepaid, to: 
Jon Bauman 
Kristina Wilson 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an 
envelope addressed as above set forth. 
Richard S. Owen 
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